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 In an effort to ascertain ways to combat the indoctrination of non-violent, low-level 
offenders into prison gangs, this study looks at a synthesis of previous research on gang 
management strategies in conjunction with interviews given to a select group of Southern Illinois 
prison administrators. It is concluded that the best way to keep these vulnerable offenders away 
from the influence of prison gangs is to quickly separate the two groups as best as possible. This 
study is admittedly modest in scope, but the findings are couched within current literature 
looking to determine effective ways to combat the spread of prison gang propaganda and 
provides a relatively useful framework for future studies on the subject. 
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Introduction 
 
In the early morning hours of June 7, 1998, William King, Lawrence Brewer, and Shawn 
Berry, three former inmates of the Texas Department of Corrections, were driving down a dirt 
road in Jasper, Texas when they spotted James Byrd, Jr., a middle-aged black man. Byrd was 
savagely beaten by the three ex-convicts, chained by his ankles to the back of Berry’s pickup 
truck, and dragged down a dirt road for three miles. His body was literally ripped to shreds in a 
brutal display of the effects of the prison gang subculture, as all three men had joined white-
supremacist prison gangs while serving their time. King, Brewer, and Berry had indeed been to 
prison, but for petty crimes such as burglary and theft. They went into the system as non-violent, 
low-level offenders and emerged from the dungeon transformed.  
As the Jasper ringleader, William King’s tale is the most intriguing because of the magnitude 
in which he immersed himself into the prison gang subculture. During the early days of his 
incarceration, King was gang raped by several black prison gang members, so he sought out the 
white gangs for protection. While serving his time, he joined a white supremacist prison gang 
and was completely indoctrinated into their way of thinking. He covered his body head-to-toe 
with Nazi and Ku Klux Klan tattoos and was a changed man by the time he got out of prison. 
Rather than reform King’s propensity for petty theft, the penal system turned him into an animal 
capable of a heinous murder before releasing him back into the community.  
While the actions of King, Brewer, and Berry are inexcusable, the story of their 
radicalization casts a rather unflattering light on one of the major problems faced by our 
correctional facilities today. The presence of prison gangs is felt throughout the entire United 
States prison system and little is done to shield low-level offenders from their influence. Prison 
gang culture has been thoroughly examined in the academic community, but minimal focus has 
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been placed on the gangs’ indoctrination of non-violent, low-level offenders into the aggressive, 
racist subculture who did not have those tendencies prior to incarceration.  
When an individual is convicted of a felony in the United States, they are sent to prison 
where they serve their time with other offenders convicted of similar crimes. Because it is 
supposed to be a punishment for breaking the law, prison life is not for the faint of heart.  
Although the environment is controlled by the State, there is a very prevalent subculture within 
the prison system that is akin to Thomas Hobbes’ state of nature in which only the strong endure. 
This concept is not new, as evidenced by the depiction of prison decades ago by Hayner and Ash 
(1940) as a deadening, coercive, and criminogenic environment. This violent subculture breeds 
extreme violence and hatred within the prison walls. Due to overpopulation and various 
economic constraints, prisons have steadily become more dangerous over the years. In order to 
survive in such a hostile place, many offenders like William King are forced to join prison gangs 
for protection. The gangs provide somewhat of a safe haven for offenders, but the gang lifestyle 
seems to facilitate a more radical transformation than the hazardous prison environment does by 
itself. Although prison gangs themselves are not the sole cause of violence amongst inmates, 
they heighten the propensity to commit violence in an overpopulated and understaffed 
environment that already facilitates an animalistic transformation.  
It is time to do away with the myth that the prison system effectively rehabilitates non-
violent offenders into becoming productive members of society. It has become increasingly 
apparent that many lower tier inmates are not ready to go back into civilization after they serve 
their time. In fact, many prisons are actually endangering society by the way they expose non-
violent offenders to the racist ideologies of prison gangs within the system. Shockingly, this 
means that taxpayer money is going towards making offenders better criminals with extensive 
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networks rather than rehabilitate their behavior. Prison gangs undermine non-violent offender 
rehabilitative programming by injecting criminogenic and racist values into the corrections 
process that is designed to correct a societal problem, not make it worse. Unfortunately, the 
system seems to be making matters more difficult for society by the way non-violent offenders 
are exposed to the gangs. Instances such as the Jasper, Texas fiasco gives testament to this 
chilling effect. 
Although it is the most gruesome tale of the effects of prison gang indoctrination, the James 
Byrd, Jr. incident is not unique. There are countless other instances of extremist activities by 
low-level offenders who become indoctrinated into racist prison gang ideologies through 
incarceration. It is the goal of this paper to determine the preventative measures prison officials 
can take to prevent non-violent, low-level offenders from joining prison gangs. This is a 
particularly important issue for the Southern Illinois community since there are numerous 
correctional facilities in the area from which offenders are constantly released back into 
mainstream society. 
Literature Review 
 Many studies have shown that gangs flourish in modern prisons and their influence is 
increasing as time goes by. (Camp & Camp, 1985). Due to their prevalence, prison gangs are 
now a widely accepted as part of the prison experience in both federal as well as state 
institutions. As Hagedorn (1998) reports, “prison gangs have become a principle form of inmate 
organization in many prisons.” Many prison gangs form along racial or ethnic lines, and this 
contributes to much higher levels of inter-group tensions within correctional facilities than in the 
outside world. (Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 2002; Ross & Richards, 2002).  
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 Simply put, a prison gang is a gang that originated within the prison system. For instance, 
gangs such as the Aryan Brotherhood, Latin Kings, Black Guerilla Family, and the Dirty White 
Boys (a small Texas branch of the Aryan Brotherhood whose name comes from a 1985 prison 
softball team) would be “pure” prison gangs because they are not street gangs that were later 
incorporated into the correctional system; these gangs were founded within the correctional 
system itself. These particular gangs are separate and distinct from criminal enterprises like the 
Crips or the Bloods, which originated outside the prison walls. Lyman (1989) defines a prison 
gang as: 
An organization which operates within the prison system as a self-perpetuating criminally 
oriented entity, consisting of a select group of inmates who have established an organized 
chain of command and are governed by an established code of conduct. The prison gang 
will usually operate in secrecy and has its goal to conduct gang activities by controlling 
their prison environment through intimidation and violence directed toward non-
members. 
 The first known American prison gang was the Gypsy Jokers formed in the 1950s in the 
Washington state correctional institutions. (Orlando-Morningstar, 1997; Stastny & Trynauer, 
1983). The first prison gang with nationwide membership was the Mexican Mafia, emerging in 
1957 in the California Department of Corrections. (Fleisher & Decker, 2001). Stemming from a 
desire for protection as well as a sense of belonging amongst the inmate population, it is no 
secret that prison gangs have been a significant part of the correctional system for quite some 
time now. 
 Although they may have very different doctrines, prison gangs tend to share many 
organizational similarities. They are very elusive, so it is all but impossible to determine their 
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organizational hierarchy. However, is known that they usually have a structure in which the 
leader oversees a council of members who make the group’s final decisions. (Fleisher & Decker, 
2001). These individuals in authoritarian positions are typically referred to as “shot callers.” The 
rank-and-file form a hierarchy that makes the gangs appear to be more similar to organized crime 
syndicates than their counterparts on the outside. (Decker, Bynum, & Weisel, 1998). Similar to 
some of their street gang counterparts, prison gangs have a creed or motto, unique symbols of 
membership, and a constitution prescribing group behavior. Absolute loyalty to the gang is a 
requirement (Marquart & Sorensen, 1997), as is secrecy. (Fong & Buentello, 1991). Violence is 
customary and is commonly used to move an offender upward toward more important positions 
within the gang’s hierarchy.   
 Prison gangs are able to sustain an existence through the drug trafficking trade. (Fleisher & 
Decker, 2001). In addition to being responsible for most of the prison violence, prison gangs 
completely dominate the drug business. (Ingraham & Wellford, 1987). Motivated by a desire to 
make as much money as possible and to be at the top of an institution’s power structure, prison 
gangs exploit the many inherent weaknesses within over-crowded and understaffed facilities. 
 Prison gangs are, for the most part, at the top of the inmate social hierarchy. As such, they are 
ruthless to defecting members. According to Fong & Vogel (1995), gang members are the 
essential capital in their crime-oriented social groups, so when members want to leave the group, 
such out-group movement jeopardizes group security, thus the so-called “blood in, blood out” 
doctrine, a term initially coined by the Mexican Mafia. These researchers surveyed 85 defecting 
prison gang members in protective custody throughout various Texas prisons and found that the 
number of gang defectors was proportional to their prison gang’s size. While a number of 
motivations were cited for leaving the gang, the three most common reasons were: (1) losing 
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interest in gang activities, (2) refusing to carry out a hit on a non-gang member, and (3) 
disagreeing with the direction of the gang’s leadership. It is practically impossible to know how 
many defectors have been killed inside and outside of prisons as a percentage of the total number 
of defectors. (Fong & Vogel, 1995). Due to the secretive nature of prison gangs, these figures 
will probably never be known. 
 There is a growing concern about the criminal activities of prison gang members, both within 
correctional facilities as well as those released back into the community. (Winterdyk & Ruddell, 
2010). As mentioned above, the James Byrd, Jr. incident is not as isolated as it may seem. 
Researchers have reported that the boundaries between the gangs in prison and the community 
are becoming increasingly blurred as the gangs become much more sophisticated, threatening not 
only prison security, but public safety as well. (Curry & Decker, 2003; Wilkinson & Delgado, 
2006). It is important, then, to understand the scope of the prison gang problem in order to 
protect the public from prison gang influence by keeping the gangs away from inmates shown to 
have non-violent tendencies. 
 Studies show a high correlation between gang membership and recidivism. (Adams & Olson, 
2002; Olson, Dooley, & Kane, 2004). For example, McShane, Williams, & Dolny (2003) 
determined that parolees who were affiliated with prison gangs were more likely to be returned 
to prison on a trivial technical violation or re-offend with a new crime than were parolees not 
affiliated with a prison gang. Similarly, Hueber, Varano, & Bynum (2007) found that gang 
membership was a strong indicator of reconviction and that parolees who were gang-related had 
the highest rates of reconviction, showing that membership in a prison gang does not bide well 
for a safe transition into the community at large. Gangs and gang membership have been steadily 
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expanding, so this problem is only getting worse as times goes by. (Decker, 2003; Hill, 2004, 
2009; Ruddell, Decker, & Egley, 2006; Wells, Minor, Angel, Carter, & Cox, 2002). 
 Despite their secretive nature, prison gangs have been analyzed rather thoroughly in the 
academic community with the primary focus being on gang suppression in general. However, 
there appears to be a distinct lack of examination on the measures that can be taken to prevent 
prison gangs from reaching non-violent, low-level offenders. Therefore, it is the aim of this 
paper to uncover some potential solutions to this inherent problem. In order to aid in the 
protection of Southern Illinois as well as surrounding areas, this paper will examine measures 
that certain regional prisons have taken to prevent the spread of prison gang propaganda to non-
violent offenders. 
Description of the Prisons Analyzed for this Study 
 This study will focus primarily on Menard Correctional Center in Chester, Illinois as well as 
United States Penitentiary (USP) Marion located in Marion, Illinois. Representing both the 
Illinois Department of Corrections as well as the Federal Bureau of Prisons, these two facilities 
are singled out because of their significance to the Southern Illinois region. Menard and Marion 
each represent historical importance for the area and each play a large role in their surrounding 
local communities. 
Menard Correctional Center, Illinois Department of Corrections 
 As one of three maximum-security prisons in the Illinois Department of Corrections, Menard 
Correctional Center is located right off of the Mississippi River in the small Southern Illinois 
town of Chester. Opened in 1878, it is the second oldest prison in the state of Illinois. Built to 
house many of the state’s worst adult male offenders, it has maintained this purpose despite its 
age and is currently home to adult males classified as maximum-security and high medium-
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security threat risks. Because of its designation as a maximum-security facility, a large part of 
Menard’s inmate culture centers around the prison gangs. Although most of the gang chiefs are 
held up north at Pontiac and Stateville, Menard’s sister maximum-security facilities, there is a 
prevalent prison gang culture within its walls. 
 Menard is an intriguing correctional institution for the purposes of this study because it is one 
of the state of Illinois’ few intake facilities. When inmates are initially transferred from their 
county jail to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, the first place many of them 
go is to Menard for processing. They begin their sentence at Menard regardless of the 
seriousness of their offense. This creates a potential (however brief) for low-level, non-violent 
offenders to be subjected to the prison gang culture. The methods in which Menard combats this 
problematic situation will be examined below.  
United States Penitentiary Marion, Federal Bureau of Prisons 
 Representing the federal side of corrections, USP Marion was specifically built in 1963 to 
replace the infamous Alcatraz Island maximum-security federal prison. Out of all the potential 
locations for Alcatraz’s replacement, Southern Illinois was chosen because of its rural location 
right in the middle of the country, as far away from our nation’s borders as any feasible location 
would allow. Since its construction, Marion has been one of the Southern Illinois region’s largest 
and most consistent employers. 
 On October 22, 1983, two members of the Aryan Brotherhood murdered two Correctional 
Officers in separate incidents. As a result, USP Marion was soon thereafter designated as the 
nation’s first “Supermax” facility in which containment, rather than rehabilitation, was the 
primary objective. Under the new scheme, inmates (mostly high escape risks and shot callers) 
were kept in solitary confinement for 22 to 23 hours out of every day. This proved to be quite 
+"
"
successful in suppressing prison gang activity, as the gang chiefs were given minimal 
opportunity to influence the world outside of their own cell. In 2006, USP Marion was 
downgraded to a medium-security unit. Despite its recent security re-classification, many current 
staff members were around during its former super-maximum security, gang-suppression days. It 
is for this reason that USP Marion will be the focal point of this study’s federal prison gang 
management strategies. 
Methodology 
 This paper looks to determine policies that would keep non-violent, low-level offenders away 
from the influence of prison gangs. This will be ascertained by combining previous research with 
interview answers provided by Southern Illinois prison administrators. First, a synthesis of 
previous research on prison gang containment strategies will be examined and then the answers 
to this study’s interview questions will be analyzed. These two sources of data will then be 
looked at in conjunction with one another and recommendations will be made based on 
information gathered from the synthesis and interviews. 
Research Synthesis as a Tool 
 Research synthesis helps to answer some of the questions posed by policy making, 
particularly by identifying, critically appraising, and summarizing what is already known in the 
research literature. (Davies, 2006). The types of questions raised by policy making require 
different types of research synthesis. For the purposes of this paper, a synthesis of 
implementation evidence approach will be taken. This type of synthesis is appropriate for this 
study because it seeks to ascertain the effectiveness of current policies. 
 Knowing exactly “what works” from a policy making perspective is insufficient without 
adequate evidence about knowing how to make a policy work in various contexts and 
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environments, and with different groups of people. (Davies, 2006). This includes evidence of the 
likely barriers to effective policy implementation as well as ways to overcome them. Such 
knowledge comes from implementation studies that use a range of research methods that include 
experimental and quasi-experimental designs, theories of change, focus groups, participant 
observation, documentary analysis, and realistic evaluation and qualitative studies using in-depth 
interviews. (Davies, 2006).  
Interviews as a Tool 
 In this study, four Menard and USP Marion administrative staff will be interviewed. Two 
will be chosen from each prison and these particular individuals are to be singled out because of 
their familiarity with the gang activity within their facility. The USP Marion interviewees will 
consist of a Lieutenant as well as a member of the Special Investigative Service, which is 
essentially the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ version of Internal Affairs who are tasked, among 
other things, to keep track of all gang members within the Bureau of Prisons. The Menard 
interviewees will comprise of a seasoned Corrections Officer and a Sergeant who both work 
directly with known gang members. The four interviews will consist of six open-ended questions 
asked at the interviewees’ residences and lasting approximately twenty minutes each. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the subject matter, the four interviewees’ identifications will remain 
anonymous throughout this paper. 
 Qualitative data is sought in this study due to the rather secretive nature of the subject matter 
sought. In an effort to add depth and substance to the data provided by previous research, the 
questions asked to the interviewees will be open-ended and structured based off the framework 
provided the previous studies. Open-ended questions are to be used to see if the interviewees will 
independently confirm that the methods for combating gang activity suggested by pervious 
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research are methods that are actually utilized in prisons. The questions look to reveal certain 
aspects of the two facilities’ gang culture by determining: 
• The types of problems the gangs cause the facilities’ day-to-day operations; 
 
• The manners in which staff are able to identify gang members; 
 
• The general gang-management strategies employed by each of the two facilities; 
 
• How non-violent, low-level offenders within each facility are screened off from the 
gangs; and 
 
• How the USP Marion and Menard staff would keep non-violent, low-level offenders 
away from prison gang culture if they could implement a policy. 
 
After this data is collected, a thematic approach will be taken to uncover common themes 
between the two facilities’ gang management policies, but also to see where there is a 
divergence.  
Synthesis 
 The synthesis in the literature about preventing the spread of gang activities in the prison 
system shows that there is little doubt that gangs pose a very serious problem for modern day 
correctional facilities. For this reason, it is important to develop strategies in order to reduce the 
influence of such groups as well as preventing the recruitment of new members. (Winterdyk & 
Ruddell, 2010). The literature tells us that it is vital to analyze the different gang management 
strategies currently employed in our nation’s prison system in order to develop a working policy 
on how to combat the integration of non-violent offenders into prison gangs. To accomplish this 
task, the first step is to determine what strategies have been working and what strategies have 
been unsuccessful within prisons throughout the country.  
 Because the gangs are such a prevalent disruptive force to day-to-day correctional operations, 
the literature shows that prison administrators have attempted a variety of overt and covert 
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strategies to combat gang activity. Some common practices include using gang informants 
(affectionately known as “rats”), designating segregation units for gang members, isolating gang 
leaders from their gangs, locking down entire institutions, vigorously prosecuting criminal acts 
committed by known gang members, and interrupting the gangs’ internal and external 
communication network. (Fleisher & Decker, 2001). To date, no single strategy has been proven 
to be superior at managing the gangs because what may be successful in one jurisdiction with a 
particular gang is not guaranteed to work in another jurisdiction with a different gang. 
(Winterdyk & Ruddell, 2010). While no one suppression tactic is used across the board, many 
prison systems have developed a common set of strategies that include programs like staff 
training and intelligence sharing, while others have developed more specialized interventions 
like isolating gang leaders, tactical transfers, and implementing gang renunciation strategies. 
(Winterdyk & Ruddell, 2010). 
 One thing is clear: intelligence gathering and dissemination is the key priority for prisons 
wishing to fight the presence of gang activities within their walls. Wells, et al. (2002) reported 
that over three-quarters of prisons have established gang management strategies that included 
various forms of communication monitoring, collecting and compiling information from 
searches (or “shakedowns”), and in many cases sharing this information with local, state, and 
federal law enforcement agencies. Nadel (1997) has noted that investigations may result in the 
development of profiles on known gang members as well as the gangs themselves in order to 
help solve crimes committed outside of prison. Corrections officials and administrators routinely 
share information intercepted from the gangs with law enforcement and these relationships have 
resulted in increased prosecutions of gang members, which is beneficial to both parties. (Thomas 
& Thomas, 2007). 
#%"
"
 In addition to information sharing between law enforcement agencies, many jurisdictions 
have used different containment strategies to prevent the exposure of gangs to the prison 
population and to reduce the flow of new members into gangs. Multiple states have 
experimented with isolating known gang members in specific units or facilities to minimize their 
influence over the general prison population. (Fischer, 2001; Hill, 2009; U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1992). Other jurisdictions have tried gang-free prisons where known gang inmates were 
transferred to designated facilities. Rivera, Cowles, & Dorman (2003) studied a Midwestern 
state’s gang-free prison intended to reduce the likelihood of inmates being recruited and found 
the program to be relatively successful. This type of scheme is indeed effective, but, 
unfortunately, rather costly. Given the state of our current economy, this gang-suppression 
option is not as feasible as it once was. 
 Successful modern-day strategies have mostly taken the form of isolating leaders or known 
members and transferring them to different institutions in order to reduce their influence. Despite 
the best of intentions, however, these programs have proven to be somewhat ineffective if not 
carefully implemented. In some cases, trying to prevent the proliferation of gangs had the 
complete opposite effect of what the officials were trying to accomplish. For example, Petersilia 
(2006) describes the 2004 situation in which  “eight leaders of La Nuestra Familia pled guilty to 
federal racketeering conspiracy charges for directing drug deals, ordering murders, and 
orchestrating robberies from their cells at Pelican Bay State Prison, California’s supermaximum-
security prison.” This instance reveals that even though the gangs’ shot callers were placed in 
isolation units, they maintained their strong influence over the prison system and were even able 
to successfully reach out into the community at large.  
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 Although it has shown to be successful at times, transferring gang leaders within the general 
prison system itself is not always effective. In fact, gang leaders moved to different prison 
systems to reduce their influence have been shown to have occasionally resulted in higher levels 
of gang membership. This is because the leaders were able to recruit brand new members they 
would not have had access to otherwise. (Winterdyk & Ruddell, 2010). This offers a grim 
reminder how important it is to consider the unforeseen or unanticipated consequences of gang 
management strategies before they are put into practice. 
 To recap, previous research reveals multiple strategies prisons implement to combat gang 
activity, but few have proven to be successful and none are absolutely flawless. The best 
methods have even been shown to yield catastrophic results when not put into operation 
properly. In essence, the literature tells us that the four methods most likely to yield results are: 
• Utilizing informants;  
• Isolating gang members; 
• Interrupting gang communication; and 
• Using gang-free prisons. 
Should prisons wish to prevent the spread of prison gang propaganda to vulnerable inmates, the 
literature says that at least one of these four approaches is preferable. 
Discussion 
 Both Menard Correctional Center and USP Marion have experienced relative success dealing 
with the gangs since the incorporation of their respective gang management strategies. Although 
the two prisons work in the same area of public administration, the agencies they operate within 
are very different from one another. The Illinois Department of Corrections as well as the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons work under completely different funding schemes that finance 
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different gang management initiatives, so their approaches are quite different from one another. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that one facility’s methods are superior to the other. 
Although implemented in different manners, there is a fair amount of crossover between the two 
facilities’ policies for suppressing prison gang activities. 
Problems Gangs Cause Day-to-Day Operations at Menard and USP Marion 
 Administrators at both Menard and USP Marion stated that the gangs caused an abundance of 
problems for their facility. When asked to list the specific hindrances gang activity creates, 
administrators’ answers ranged all the way from “assaults on staff” (Anonymous Interviewee 1, 
personal communication, November 1, 2013) and “moving contraband in the form of weapons 
and drugs when they can get them in” (Anonymous Interviewee 4, personal communication, 
November 3, 2013) to “more paperwork.” (Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal communication, 
November 2, 2013). Additionally, consistent with Fleisher & Decker’s (2001) assertion, Menard 
and USP Marion inmates are known to recruit people from the outside to “mule” contraband in 
such as drugs, tobacco, and weapons. (Anonymous Interviewee 2, personal communication, 
October 31, 2013; Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal communication, November 2, 2013). It 
seems that the reach of the prison gangs in both prisons was not limited to the facilities’ 
themselves, causing the staff a variety of problems. There was very little divergence between the 
types of difficulties described within the two facilities. 
 Administrators at both prisons stated that the gangs, although based on racial lines, have been 
known to contract with one another. It seems that the only color that truly matters for prison 
gangs in Menard and USP Marion is green. Money is used by the gangs for a variety of reasons 
such as financing contraband smuggling, funding extreme violence, and even to promote 
gambling. When it came to money, Illegal gambling was a major concern expressed by members 
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at both facilities primarily because of the way the gambling operations brutally extort inmates 
unable to pay gambling debts. Enforcement of a gambling debt is usually not very pretty. If the 
debtor owes even a trivial amount to a gang, “between four to six gang members will roll up on 
the guy and beat the hell out of them until they pay.” (Anonymous Interviewee 1, personal 
communication, November 3, 2013). Sometimes when the debt is large enough, the gangs will 
actually force the debtor into prostitution until their debt is settled. (Anonymous Interviewee 3, 
personal communication, November 2, 2013). Due to the accumulation of compound interest, 
this arrangement can last anywhere from a couple of weeks to several years at a time. 
(Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal communication, November 2, 2013). 
How Menard and USP Marion Staff Identifies Gang Members 
 Determining which inmates are in gangs is very important for both facilities since gang 
members seem to cause a substantial amount of problems within each prison. Upon the arrival of 
new inmates to their facilities, the staff at Menard and USP Marion each blatantly ask their 
intakes who they “ride” with. (Anonymous Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 31, 
2013; Anonymous Interviewee 1, personal communication, November 1, 2013). Surprisingly, 
this simple method is quite effective for learning up front which inmates are gang-affiliated. 
However, the admission alone does not enable the classification of the individual as a known 
gang member, or rise to the status as a “verified” gang member at USP Marion. (Anonymous 
Interviewee 1, personal communication, November 1, 2013). There are certain other attributes 
the prison officials must observe before an inmate becomes a verified gang member. 
 USP Marion operates under the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ “Five Point System” to verify the 
gang member status of inmates. (Anonymous Interviewee 1, personal communication, November 
1, 2013; Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal communiation, November 2, 2013). According to 
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this plan, an inmate must acquire five points before they are branded as a known gang member. 
An inmate gets two points for admitting they are in a gang, one point if they have a gang tattoo, 
one point if they have been seen affiliating with a known gang member, and one point if they 
have been observed participating in gang activity. (Anonymous Interviewee 1, personal 
communication, November 1, 2013; Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal communication, 
November 2, 2013). A score from one to two deems an inmate as an “associate,” a score of three 
to four makes them “unverified,” and a score of five classifies them as “verified.” (Anonymous 
Interviewee 1, personal communication, November 1, 2013). In some rare instances, an inmate 
will be considered “verified” even when they do not confirm their gang status when it is blatantly 
obvious through their actions that they are gang affiliated. (Anonymous Interviewee 1, personal 
communication, November 1, 2013). An associate must “make their bones” before they are 
considered a “solid guy” in the gang culture, so associates are heavily monitored due to the 
anticipation they will attempt something drastic. (Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal 
communication, November 2, 2013). Menard does not have a comparable formal system, but 
seems to use the same basic tools. Just like USP Marion, they look for tattoos and see who 
known gang members affiliate with, but seem to rely more heavily on informants when making 
their determination. (Anonymous Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 31, 2013). 
Gang Management Strategies used by Menard and USP Marion 
 Once gang members are identified by both facilities, they implement a variety of strategies to 
combat gang activity. As described above, both place a large emphasis on gang recognition by 
utilizing various mediums, but both facilities seem to combat gang activity in different ways. It 
appears that Menard takes more a hard proactive stance while USP Marion approaches the matter 
in a reactive way. 
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 Menard attempts to fight gang activity by trying to prevent the gangs from organizing in the 
first place. “If they can’t organize,” Anonymous Interviewee 2 explains, “they will have a hard 
time carrying out the tasks they want to carry out.” (personal communication, October 31, 2013). 
Menard appears to focus primarily on preventing all gang activity before it can gain any 
momentum. Consistent with the methodology described by Fleisher & Decker (2001), they do 
this by heavily monitoring suspected gang communication as well as placing suspected gang 
members in segregation units the moment they are observed participating in gang activity. 
Further, inmates observed participating in gang activity could be stripped of other luxuries such 
as commissary, rec yard, television, and the ability to have visitors. (Anonymous Interviewee 2, 
personal communication, October 31, 2013). The administrative staff at Menard seems to think 
that these gang activity disincentives work fairly well, but that they are not completely 
preventative. 
 USP Marion relies heavily on communication monitoring to keep track of gang activity. 
However, even though they share the same goal of gang management as Menard, USP Marion 
seems to use a very different approach to combating gangs. According to Anonymous 
Interviewee 3, “It is the unofficial policy of the Bureau [of Prisons] to let some [gang activity] 
slide. If we came down too hard on everyone, we wouldn’t know anything.” (personal 
communication, November 2, 2013). This method is in stark contrast to Menard’s philosophy of 
zero tolerance, but it seems to yield comparably successful results. “The act of allowing some 
activities to go unpunished enables us to go further down the rabbit hole than we ever would 
have if we were tough up front,” says Anonymous Interviewee 3. (personal communication, 
November 2, 2013). Since gang activities can take the form very elaborate, clever schemes, the 
administrative staff at USP Marion feels that the best way to uncover previously unknown 
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activities is to let certain low-level gang activities take their course. (Anonymous Interviewee 1, 
personal communication, November 1, 2013; Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal 
communication, November 2, 2013). Once the perceived activities rise to the level staff deems 
acceptable to intervene, USP Marion utilizes the same kinds of punishments as Menard such as 
placing inmates in segregation (known as Special Housing Units, commonly referred to as 
“shoe”), restricting commissary, preventing visitation, taking away rec yard, and removing 
television/entertainment privileges. (Anonymous Interviewee 1, personal communication, 
November 1, 2013; Anonymous Interviewee 3, personal communication, November 2, 2013). 
Like Menard, USP Marion staff feels like these measures are successful, but since there is no real 
way of measuring their success there is no definitive way of knowing exactly how successful. 
How Menard and USP Marion Screen off Non-violent, Low-level Offenders from the 
Gangs Within their Facilities 
 
 Surprisingly, the interviews revealed that neither facility has a formal policy for keeping the 
prison gangs away from non-violent, low-level offenders. However, this does not mean that 
various informal measures are not taken to keep the two groups separated. Both facilities seem to 
run fairly extensive background checks on newly transferred inmates in order to ascertain certain 
attributes such as violent tendencies and gang membership. In a manner similar to that explained 
by Thomas & Thomas (2007) and Wells, et al. (2002), the two prisons share information with 
other agencies, both within the field of corrections as well as other agencies involved in different 
types of law enforcement. At Menard, for example, once the determination has been made as to 
where an inmate should be temporarily held, the staff tries their best to separate the violent 
inmates and inmates with gang affiliation from the lower level, non-violent inmates in order to 
prevent incidences of violence. (Anonymous Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 
31, 2013). Although, as Anonymous Interviewee 4 puts it, “It is not a perfect system because 
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sometimes we don’t always get all the information on these guys before we decide where to put 
them. Sometimes we don’t get the whole picture and some really bad guys can end up with fish.1 
It doesn’t happen often, but it definitely does from time to time. That is never a good situation, 
so we try out best to keep fish away from the gangs while they are temporarily housed [at 
Menard].” (personal communication, November 3, 2013).  
 True to its easier-going, reactive polity towards gangs, the staff at USP Marion tends to let 
things run their course when it comes to keeping gangs away from non-violent, low-level 
offenders. The reason for this is primarily because they have created a system that highly 
incentivizes gang snitches to inform staff when active recruiting takes place. (Anonymous 
Interviewee 1, personal communication, November 1, 2013). It does not happen very often 
because the USP Marion gangs tend to stay away from non-gang members, but when it does the 
staff immediately attempts to interfere with the process. According to Anonymous Interviewee 3, 
“When recruitment is suspected, we approach the shot callers and tell them to knock it off and 
tell them that it is their head if we find out their gang is recruiting.” (personal communication, 
November 2, 2013). Accordingly, this scheme seems to be relatively successful at preventing the 
spread of gang propaganda to non-violent, low-level offenders, but obviously it is not perfect. 
Recommendations by Menard and USP Marion Staff on How to Keep Non-violent, Low-
level Offenders Away from the Prison Gang Subculture 
 
 It seems as though many incoming inmates already have ties to prison gangs and “unless they 
have tats or claim to be in a gang, it really makes it difficult to know who is rolling with who,” 
claims Anonymous Interviewee 4. (personal communication, November 3, 2013). While there 
have been numerous formalized plans to prevent the two groups from crossing paths such as 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""#"A term used to denote a new inmate who has never been in corrections, as they are essentially a 
“fish out of water.” 
$#"
"
coming down extremely hard on the gangs when they attempt to recruit new members, the gangs 
will still actively recruit anyway. According to Anonymous Interviewee 2, “Prison gangs are 
over-glamorized in the media and when new inmates get into prison, they are almost star struck. 
The gangs know how they are seen in the outside world and take advantage of that when they 
recruit.” (personal communication, October 31, 2013). 
 In order to combat this phenomenon, administrators at both facilities seem to agree that the 
best way to keep the gangs away from non-violent, low-level offenders is to separate them. “It is 
not cost-effective,” as Anonymous Interviewee 3 puts it, “but you need to keep them away from 
one another. You can do this by having separate cell blocks, but the very best way to do this 
would be to have completely different ‘gang free’ prisons.” (personal communication, November 
2, 2013). While the option of building new prisons or reclassifying existing facilities as “gang-
free” in a manner consistent with that described by Rivera, Cowles, & Dorman (2003) seems to 
be the consensus as to the superior way to keep gangs away from non-violent, low-level 
offenders, the cost factor makes this rather unfeasible in practice.  
Conclusions and Future Study 
 This study’s interviews reveal that prison administrators can fight the proliferation of prison 
gangs either reactively or proactively. Neither way is perfect and the two schemes appear to have 
their own distinct benefits and detriments. Menard’s retroactive system has the advantage of 
stopping gang activity before it even starts. This method has the benefit of preventing the spread 
of prison gang propaganda to non-violent, low-level inmates prior to the ideologies taking root. 
However, the problem with this approach is that it facilitates an environment in which inmates 
are forced to become even more secretive to ensure the survival of their gang. This makes 
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monitoring gang activity extraordinarily difficult, leaving prison administrators with the uneasy 
feeling that they are not seeing the big picture.  
 USP Marion’s reactive system has the advantage of acquiring remarkable intelligence on the 
gangs. Because prison gangs are very clever and adaptive, this method of allowing certain types 
of gang activity to go unpunished allows the USP Marion administrators the ability to learn 
about gang activities that would have previously gone unnoticed under a more aggressive 
approach. While this plan provides an abundance of insight into the gangs, the problem is that 
this method enables illegal gang initiatives to go unpunished inside of a law enforcement facility. 
In addition, this is incredibly risky because it assumes that larger, more elaborate undertakings 
will be revealed if the less serious behaviors are disregarded, but that is not always the case. 
 In order to prevent the spread of gang propaganda to non-violent, low-level offenders, the 
USP Marion reactive way of gang management is problematic because it facilitates the spreading 
of racist ideologies and only intervenes when dangerous levels are reached. By the time the 
intervention takes place, there is no telling how much poison has been injected into a non-
violent, low-level offender. For this reason, a proactive approach similar to that employed by 
Menard would be ideal to prevent the gangs from influencing these types of vulnerable 
offenders. 
 When viewed in conjunction with one another, both the literature synthesis and the 
interviews tell us that the best way to stop gang propaganda from reaching non-violent, low-level 
offenders is to separate the two groups. Combined with a proactive approach, this means that the 
separation should take place as early as possible once a gang-status determination is made. 
Effective law enforcement interagency communication, such as that described by Thomas & 
Thomas (2007), will help facilitate a quicker classification process and decrease the likelihood of 
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the two groups coming into contact. The most practical way to accommodate this split would be 
the utilization of separate “gang-free” housing units. While this recommendation does not 
completely solve the problem since the gangs can still make contact through other mediums such 
as chow halls, rec yards, or a variety of other channels, it at least minimizes the opportunities for 
direct contact. 
 This paper only examined the gang management strategies of two prisons, so any future 
inquiries into this subject matter would be encouraged to incorporate a wider variety of facilities 
into a study. Also, since this study took place during a time of economic disparity, it was unable 
to fully ascertain the effectiveness of gang-free prisons. Since academics and administrators alike 
seem to agree that gang-free prisons are possibly the best way to prevent the spread of gang 
propaganda to non-violent, low-level offenders, it is recommended that any future studies look 
into the effects of gang-free prisons once the option becomes more feasible. 
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